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Preface
It is my pleasure to present Stimson’s latest publication, Lost in Translation? U.S. 
Defense Innovation and Northeast Asia. As the security dynamics in Northeast Asia 
adjust to new leadership in both South Korea and in the United States, this report 
is a timely analysis of the debate in the U.S. regarding future military structure 
and technologies under the Third Offset Strategy – and how technological change 
may impact American alliances with Japan and South Korea, and the complex 
relationship with China.
The discussions that the Stimson team began with defense policy experts 
in China, Japan, and South Korea covered topics that can be uncomfortable. 
Nonetheless, policymakers on both sides of the Pacific avoid these issues at their 
peril. Productive international relationships that contribute to regional stability 
and defuse potential crises – whether between allies or competitors – depend 
upon regular, candid conversations about the future of defense policy. During 
the First and Second Offset Strategies, the United States encountered difficulties 
in intra-alliance management through its failure to address technological gaps 
and diverging strategic interests with its allies, and by not clearly articulating U.S. 
strategy. As this report reveals from the discussions in Northeast Asia, allies and 
competitor alike are concerned with both the vagueness of America’s strategy 
and its continuing technological strides. Voices of the present and lessons from 
the past inform the report’s recommendations to deepen American engagement 
with Japan, South Korea, and China by clarifying strategic debates and improving 
communication and cooperation with allies.
For spearheading this important research, we are indebted to Yuki Tatsumi, 
the Director of Stimson’s Japan Program, whose expertise on Japanese defense 
policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance stimulated the development of this project. I 
would also like to thank Alex Bollfrass, a Nonresident Fellow at Stimson, who 
specializes in nuclear weapons and intelligence-related issues, for leading the 
roundtable discussions with the Northeast Asian defense community. Pamela 
Kennedy provided research support and guidance throughout the project lifecycle.
Finally, I would like to thank the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center on 
Contemporary Conflict, which operates the Project on Advanced Systems and 
Concepts for Countering WMD, and its Executive Director Dr. Michael Malley for 







This project was made possible by the funding provided by the Project on Advanced 
Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (PASCC). 
First and foremost, I would like to thank the Naval Postgraduate School, which 
managed the PASCC grant program on behalf of the Defense Threat Reduction 
Agency for FY2016.
Next, I would like to thank the many people who contributed to this project. My 
deep gratitude goes to those who spared the time to review the drafts of the report 
as it underwent several revisions. Dr. Barry Blechman, Dr. Zack Cooper, CAPT (sel.) 
Dan E. Fillion, Col. David M. Franklin, and Col. Robert Makros generously provided 
detailed reviews of early drafts, and their thoughtful, expert commentary helped 
bring the report to its final form. Col. John B. Atkinson, Honorable Robert M. Scher, 
and Col. James B. Zientek provided valuable feedback as well. Dr. Thomas Mahnken, 
CAPT Jan Van Tol, and Dr. Stacie Pettyjohn provided very helpful suggestions as my 
team and I set the parameters of the report. All errors remaining after such insightful 
feedback are my own.
I am equally grateful for the Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean defense policy 
experts who took the time to engage in the Track 2 discussions. It is clear that this 
report would not have been possible without their frank responses to the questions 
we posed. As we conducted the conversations in Northeast Asia under the Chatham 
House Rule so that we could engage these experts in candid discussion, I cannot 
thank them individually or institutionally. Nevertheless, my team and I are grateful 
for their candid conversations that informed the findings of this report.
Finally, I would like to thank my team at Stimson for their role in successfully 
concluding this project. Alex Bollfrass, Stimson’s Nonresident Fellow, made 
important contributions in conducting research, leading the Track 2 discussions, 
and providing the initial draft of the report. My colleague Yun Sun, Senior Associate 
of the East Asia Program, was critical in facilitating the meetings in China. East Asia 
Program Research Associate Pamela Kennedy and Japan Program Research Intern 
Peter Wyckoff provided essential support in research, fact-checking, writing, and 
copyediting. Stimson Japan Program alumna Carolyn Posner graciously copyedited 
the final draft, and Research Interns Grant Anderla, Hyebin Joo, and Jonathan Lesh 
provided additional research and copyediting. I also cannot thank enough the small 
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Abbreviations
A2/AD  Anti-access/area denial
ACM  Alliance coordination mechanism
C4ISR  Command, control, communications, computers,
   intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
CFC   Combined force command
DARPA  Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DII   Defense Innovation Initiative
DOD  Department of Defense
FMS   Foreign military sales
MOD  Ministry of Defense
MTR  Military-technical revolution
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDS   National Defense Strategy
NDU  National Defense University
PLA   People’s Liberation Army
QDR  Quadrennial Defense Review
R&D  Research and development
RMA  Revolution in military affairs
SDF   Self-Defense Forces
SM-3 Block IIA Standard Missile 3 Block IIA
THAAD  Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense
U.S.   United States
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
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Introduction 
There is increasing concern among American strategic thinkers regarding the 
possibility that U.S. adversaries will utilize “disruptive technologies” to limit U.S. 
power-projection capability. Indeed, with China officially identified in the 2006 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) as the country that demonstrates the greatest 
potential to leverage disruptive military technologies,1 the U.S. strategic community 
has shared an increasing sense of urgency that the capability gap between the 
United States and China has been closing quickly. Operational concepts such as 
Joint Operational Access Concept,2 Joint Forcible Entry Operations,3 and more 
recently the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons4 and 
Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment and Expeditionary Advanced Base 
Operations,5 focus on countering an adversary that employs anti-access/area-denial 
(A2/AD) tactics. They have been driven by heightened concerns about the rapid 
military modernization undertaken by China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and 
the capabilities and technologies in which the PLA has been investing, such as stealth 
weaponry, cybersecurity, anti-satellite weapons, and cruise missiles. The story that 
unfolds in Andrew Krepinevich’s 2009 book 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist 
Explores War in the 21st Century is demonstrative of American strategic thinkers’ 
concerns about China’s A2/AD capability. Krepinevich lays out the case for how, in 
the event of a crisis over the Taiwan Strait, China’s enhanced capabilities in missiles, 
space weapons, and cyber could effectively handicap the U.S. ability to intervene 
militarily to stop a Chinese attempt to reunify Taiwan by force.6
Thus, in the last several years, there has been a robust debate within the U.S. 
strategic community over the Third Offset Strategy. During the Cold War, the U.S. 
utilized similar strategies twice,i investing in a small group of advanced military 
technologies to “offset” the quantitative disadvantage the U.S. military had vis-à-
vis the Soviet Union by maintaining a qualitative edge. While the concept of the 
Third Offset Strategy has yet to be defined precisely, debate around the concept has 
focused on how the U.S. should organize its defense strategy, military operational 
concepts, research and development (R&D), and acquisition process to “offset” 
impact of the disruptive technologies employed by its adversaries.7 
The emergence and proliferation of disruptive technologies – technologies that, 
if effectively employed by adversaries, would considerably limit U.S. capability 
to defend its national interests, as well as its allies – presents the U.S. with a 
complicated challenge in Northeast Asia. The region is home to two key allies, 
Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea), which face an immediate 
military threat posed by North Korea. At the same time, the region is increasingly 
influenced by China’s growing assertiveness, matched by its increasing military 
i.  The First Offset Strategy was implemented during the Eisenhower Administration under the “New Look” strategy; the Second Offset Strategy started during the Carter Administration 
and continued under the Reagan Administration.
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capabilities. Such a security environment should compel the U.S., Japan, and 
South Korea to work closely together to address tangible security challenges and 
to maintain stability in the region. But mutual suspicion between Japan and South 
Korea runs deep, preventing them from strengthening security cooperation beyond 
efforts to respond to the pressing threat of North Korea. The United States and 
China, while seeking to establish strategic stability, are also both investing in the 
development of a full range of next generation technologies to gain a strategic edge, 
including hypersonic vehicles, cyber warfare capabilities, anti-satellite capabilities, 
and unmanned systems with state-of-the-art robotics technology. Furthermore, 
emerging perceptions that U.S. military and economic power are declining relative 
to China’s capabilities is driving uncertainty in Japan and South Korea regarding 
the reliability of U.S. defense commitments in the region.
The United States must ensure that its military can adapt to an evolving threat 
environment to maintain its relative advantage vis-à-vis potential adversaries. 
In the context of Northeast Asia, it can and should work in cooperation with its 
allies and partners in the region to address the challenges presented by disruptive 
technologies of potential adversaries to realize the necessary adaptation. Should 
the U.S. tackle this task unilaterally, however, the perception of relative U.S. decline 
will only aggravate uncertainties in Japan and South Korea about U.S. defense 
commitments. The U.S. must take advantage of the current period, in which both 
Japan and South Korea have demonstrated significant interest in closer defense 
ties with the United States. Japan’s effort to strengthen alliance relations with the 
United States was seen in the recently-revised U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense 
Cooperation. A similar attitude was reflected in the South Korean government’s 
decision to accept U.S. deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense 
(THAAD) missile system – despite debates within the new Moon administration 
over the balance between the need for economic security from China on the one 
hand and national security from the United States on the other.
To assist leaders of the U.S.’s strategic relationships with these critical tasks, 
this report examines Northeast Asian perceptions of the risks posed by disruptive 
technologies in the military sphere and recommends a series of policy steps to 
minimize these risks. The views of U.S. allies and partners are shaped in part by the 
debate in the United States about future defense technology and concepts, a debate 
that is more thinking-aloud than substantial policy. Taking these perceptions into 
consideration, the report suggests ways to link the conversation across the Pacific.
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Context: Revolution in Military Affairs  
and Offset Strategies
The discussion of military innovations and revolution in military affairs (RMA) 
has long been part of the scholarly discussion on military strategy and its history.8 
Scholars have debated issues such as what incentivizes innovative change,9 the cost 
of reform,10 how RMA can be theorized,11 and why some efforts for innovation have 
an impact far-reaching enough to affect the dynamics of international politics, 
while others do not – debates that continue to the present.12
Discussions of RMA were first begun by U.S. defense strategists in the early 
1990s after the overwhelming U.S. victory in the 1991 Gulf War. Subsequent 
analysis including the assessment of “military-technical revolution (MTR)”13 for 
the Department of Defense (DOD)’s Office of Net Assessment have been informed 
by these scholarly debates, but are narrower in scope. Specifically, the discussion 
of RMA among U.S. defense strategists focuses on how the U.S. can and should 
take advantage of advanced technology to sustain its military superiority relative 
to adversaries. In examining Soviet military strategists’ observation of U.S. 
development of advanced military technologies, such as stealth and precision-
guided weapons and cruise missiles, and how the U.S. military integrated these new 
capabilities into military operations, Krepinevich observed that Soviet military 
strategists may have detected U.S. RMA earlier than U.S. strategists themselves had 
realized. He argued that the United States, at the time of his assessment, was in a 
very early stage of the revolutionary period and predicted that it would take several 
decades of ongoing change to unfold fully.14
It is in the context of discussion about RMA that offset strategies, including the 
recent Third Offset Strategy, need to be examined. The United States implemented 
its First Offset Strategy, known as the “New Look” strategy, during the Eisenhower 
Administration. The objective of this strategy was to address the overwhelming Soviet 
advantage in conventional forces deployed in Europe without weakening American 
economic and fiscal health. The U.S. focused its investments on nuclear weapons 
(miniaturization of warheads in particular), bombers, and missiles. The Second Offset 
Strategy emerged between the late 1970s and early 1980s as it became apparent after 
the Cuban missile crisis that the Soviet Union was again gaining numerical advantage 
vis-à-vis the United States in almost every aspect of military capability, including its 
nuclear forces. The U.S. attempted to neutralize the USSR’s effort by focusing on a 
limited range of advanced weapons technology that its existing strategic forces could 
exploit, thereby preventing Moscow from catching up to the United States. Among 
the technologies that the U.S. focused on developing were stealth, precision guidance 
technology, cruise missiles, and networking of its communication system.15
These two Cold War-era offset strategies prioritized investment in a select 
number of advanced technologies in order to maintain a qualitative edge over the 
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Soviet Union. But neither of the offset strategies focused exclusively on investing 
in advanced technologies. Rather, what was more significant was the profound 
impact these technologies made on U.S. strategic warfare, prompting adaptations 
to operational concepts, doctrines, and force postures. For instance, the investment 
that the U.S. made in its nuclear forces eventually led to a new doctrine known 
as “massive retaliation,” which called for the use of nuclear weapons early in a 
conflict. The main instrument of American defensive and deterrent capability 
under this new doctrine was anchored in its new intercontinental bomber fleet of 
the Strategic Air Command. The budget was also reallocated in favor of the Air 
Force and Navy at the expense of the Army and Marine Corps. The much-reduced 
Army was equipped with tactical nuclear weapons. One might argue that what we 
see today as examples of the technological advantages of U.S. military technologies 
– F-22s, missile defenses, C4ISR, precision-guided munitions – are by and large the 
realization of technologies developed under the Second Offset Strategy. 
The most recent debate surrounding the Third Offset Strategy seems driven 
by concerns about what scholars such as Michael Horowitz view as the impact 
of the diffusion of advanced technologies on international politics.ii The concept 
of technological disruption first appeared in the 2005 National Defense Strategy 
(NDS), which introduced “disruptive challenges” as an emerging security threat 
facing the U.S. in the 21st century.16 In discussing “disruptive challenges,” the 2005 
NDS referred to the possibility that “revolutionary technology and associated 
military innovation can fundamentally alter long-established concepts of warfare,” 
and warned that some “potential adversaries are seeking disruptive capabilities to 
exploit U.S. vulnerabilities and offset the current advantages of the United States and 
its partners.”17 The 2006 QDR further elaborated on the U.S. defense establishment’s 
need to shift the focus of its defense strategy to better respond to “asymmetric 
threats, including irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive challenges.”18 The Review 
also identified China as the emerging power with “the greatest potential to compete 
militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that 
could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages absent U.S. counter 
strategies.”19 Following the 2006 QDR, the 2010 QDR continued to discuss the 
possibility of current and future U.S. adversaries taking advantage of emerging 
technologies to use “asymmetric tactics to disrupt the superiority of U.S. military 
power.”20 The 2010 QDR argued that the DOD “must not only prepare for those 
threats…but also build the agile, adaptive, and innovative structures capable of 
quickly identifying emerging gaps and adjusting program and budgetary priorities 
to rapidly field capabilities that will mitigate those gaps.”21 In other words, the 
U.S. now needs to find a balance between maintaining its powerful military force 
while also pursuing the capabilities to counter the impact of evolving “disruptive 
technologies” that offer asymmetric options to its competitors.
ii.   Horowitz points out that, because of the high cost associated with the organizational changes that are required for integrating new technologies into a country’s broader strategy, 
innovation often upsets the existing power balance of international politics, benefitting the rising powers that are nimbler than the status-quo powers. Horowitz, Michael C. The Diffusion 
of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics. Princeton: Princeton University, 2010.
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It was not until 2014, when the QDR noted that the Asia-Pacific region faces 
“greater risk that tensions over long-standing sovereignty disputes or claims to 
natural resources will spur disruptive competition or erupt into conflict,”22 that 
serious discussion of the Third Offset Strategy began to gain traction within the 
U.S. defense establishment. Citing China’s increasing military budget and lack 
of transparency on the part of Beijing regarding its intentions, the 2014 QDR 
discussed U.S. defense commitments in the Asia-Pacific region as a tool to prevent 
“miscalculation and disruptive regional competition and avoid escalatory acts 
that could lead to conflict.”23 Building on the 2014 QDR, in a speech at National 
Defense University (NDU) on August 5, 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert 
Work argued that unless the United States began serious discussions on how to 
maintain its military forces’ technological advantage, the U.S. armed forces would 
face “an arsenal of advanced, disruptive technologies that could turn our previous 
technological advantage on its head – where our armed forces no longer have 
uncontested theater access or unfettered operational freedom of maneuver.”24 
Shortly after Work’s speech at NDU, then Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel 
announced the launch of the Defense Innovation Initiative (DII), a DOD-wide 
effort to “pursue innovative ways to sustain and advance our military superiority 
for the 21st century and improve business operations throughout the Department.”25 
In a speech coinciding with the memorandum’s release, Hagel observed that, while 
the United States was preoccupied with counterinsurgency operations to address 
security threats posed by al-Qaeda and other Islamic terrorist organizations, 
strategic competitors such as Russia and China were heavily investing in military 
modernization to close the technological gap.26 Hagel described DII as an initiative 
which he hoped would develop into a “third offset strategy.”27
Indeed, the rapid pace of growth in China’s military capabilities has caught 
the attention of American strategic thinkers for some time. As early as 2003, 
scholars such as Krepinevich and Barry Watts have identified the growing risk of 
potential adversaries’ A2/AD challenges to the U.S. military’s power-projection 
capability. They argued that potential adversaries’ acquisition and fielding of 
satellite and missile capabilities will increase risk for U.S. forward-deployed forces, 
with China and North Korea as the two prime examples of countries that pose 
A2/AD challenges to the U.S. military.28 Beijing’s focus on investing in missile 
technology, modernization of its fighter fleet, efforts to build a blue water navy, 
and activities in new battle domains such as space and cyber point to China as a 
near-peer competitor of the United States. In particular, Beijing’s investment in 
these technologies has a disruptive impact on anticipated U.S. military operations 
not only in Northeast Asia, but in the broader Asia-Pacific region, as such advances 
could inhibit U.S. military access to potential areas of crisis, limiting America’s 
ability to maneuver. Although discussion of the “Third Offset Strategy” carefully 
avoids singling out China, the sense of urgency generated by the reality that China 
is quickly catching up to the United States in key areas of military technology has 
no doubt been the primary driver of the Third Offset.
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The Third Offset Strategy envisions robust collaboration with U.S. allies. In 
January 2015, Work elaborated on three key differences between the two Cold War 
era offset strategies and the current Third Offset: much longer timelines before the 
new strategy sees tangible results, the necessity of addressing more diverse threats 
(from nation-state adversaries and non-state actors), and the reality that, unlike the 
Cold War era, many technological advances will come from the private sector.29 Work 
stressed that the U.S. should be cognizant of the importance of interdependence with 
its allies. He noted that the U.S. allies each have “certain key advantage or certain 
key things that they are really, really good at,” and emphasized the need for the U.S. 
to think about the alliances in the context of specialization, while acknowledging 
concerns about the technology gaps between alliance partners.30
In fact, what Work envisions resonates very much with critical issues that 
Krepinevich identified in his 1992 MTR assessment. Some of the questions that 
Krepinevich put forward in regards to the role of U.S. allies are as follows:
• Would the U.S. want to develop the next generation military capability 
jointly with our allies,iii or would it hope to maintain some margin of 
advantage over all other countries?
• Would the U.S. envision coalition warfare in which our friends are as 
capable as we are, or would the U.S. provide certain kinds of capabilities 
and/or function that others lack?
• Would the fiscal and other constraints of U.S. allies make the 
management of these issues more challenging?
• Should the U.S. approach to its allies be consistent regardless of the types 
of operations it discusses, or should the discussion be tailored to specific 
operations that the U.S. military is expected to undertake with various allies?31
Overall, the concept of the Third Offset Strategy has not been well understood 
within the U.S., let alone among allies and partners. This is because the Third Offset was 
understood to mean different things even within the DOD. For instance, to Secretary 
of Defense Ash Carter, it was about innovative technologies and investment in “over-
the-horizon” technologies, as well as leveraging robust high-tech capacity in the private 
sector, as he elaborated in a speech in October 2016.32 However, other senior defense 
officials, including Deputy Secretary of Defense Work and Vice Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff General Paul Selva, have presented the core of the Third Offset as more 
about “operational and organizational innovation.”33 For those who subscribe to this 
view, while there is genuine merit in innovation, the U.S. simply cannot out-innovate 
adversaries, and thus it makes more sense to leverage operational and organizational 
strengths to address the most pressing concerns, such as “precision strike en masse.” 
With the Trump administration in place, the challenge of communicating American 
intentions about the Third Offset Strategy may grow, as U.S. allies and partners ask 
more fundamental questions about mutual commitments to their alliances.
iii.  For example, the F-35, despite the problems in the developments, is considered a successful example of the U.S. jointly developing a new capability with its allies.
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Northeast Asian Perspectives
Emerging technologies and technological disruption can profoundly impact the 
international security environment, changing the array of capabilities in play and 
forcing countries to reassess the risks and opportunities afforded by their arsenals 
and international relations. The U.S. response to new and unexpected technologies 
further complicates future scenarios. An effective counter to the weaponization 
of disruptive technologies by strategic competitors takes the form of developing 
American emerging technologies to offset potential disruptions – focusing on 
long-range attack capabilities and broader utilization of unmanned platforms. 
But a strategy built around these types of technologies could affect the forward-
deployed presence that the U.S. maintains in some regions, which would require 
close consultation with the allies that consider this presence to be the most tangible 
sign of U.S. security commitments.
While this issue applies to many U.S. allies around the world, this report focuses 
on alliances in Northeast Asia, where the U.S. faces its main strategic competitor, 
China. Northeast Asian international relations are fraught with tension, due to 
historical issues dating to World War II and earlier, China’s growing assertiveness 
in the East and South China Seas where it has competing territorial claims vis-à-
vis its neighbors,iv fears of military modernization or build-up in the region, and 
the increasing threat of a nuclear North Korea. Adding emerging technology to 
the situation could change the current balance, without necessarily mitigating 
fundamental challenges. But conversation among policymakers and defense planners 
about how the U.S., Japan, and South Korea might adapt to a potentially profound 
change in American military posture in Northeast Asia has not yet occurred.
Obstacles to a necessary conversation  
among allies in Northeast Asia
A reason for this lack of discussion is the hub-and-spokes security structure, with 
the U.S. allying separately with Japan and South Korea, rather than forming a 
collective security organization like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO). The hub-and-spokes model depends heavily on American ability to 
maintain robust alliances, and the complex relationship between Japan and South 
Korea, made bitter and mistrustful by the legacy of their 20th century history, poses 
a great challenge to bridging the two alliances. While operational-level trilateral 
dialogues and exercises occur with regularity, the U.S. has not been able to cultivate 
the deeper trust between South Korea and Japan necessary to hold more sensitive, 
strategic conversations at a high level.
iv.   In the case of the South China Sea, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled on July 12, 2016 that China’s territorial claim based on its historical “Nine-Dash Line” 
was invalid under international law.
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Furthermore, the status of Japan and South Korea as junior allies has helped 
foster a mentality of reliance on the security guarantee provided by American 
military capabilities. For example, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty obligates 
the U.S. to come to the defense of Japan should Japanese territories or areas of 
administrative control be threatened, but Japan does not have a reciprocal 
obligation to defend the U.S. homeland should the United States be attacked. The 
U.S.-Republic of Korea Mutual Defense Treaty does require a reciprocal response 
from South Korea, and in the past, South Korean armed forces fought alongside the 
U.S. in the Vietnam War and in Operation Iraqi Freedom. While such operations by 
South Korean armed forces have been important for the U.S., the U.S.-ROK alliance 
has served primarily as a bulwark against North Korea, and U.S. bases and troop 
presence in South Korea are seen by Koreans as the manifestation of U.S. defense 
commitments.34 The lack of participation and limited geographic scope of Japan 
Self-Defense Force (SDF) operations and the U.S.-ROK alliance’s intense focus on 
the North Korea threat have contributed to a widening gap in military technology 
and operational capability between the U.S. military and alliance partners.
Part of the reason, too, for the lack of discussion of emerging technologies is 
that North Korea’s accelerating menace preoccupies the allies to the extent that 
the threat from China takes lower priority. The clear and present security threat 
requires a level of vigilance that makes it difficult to focus on less tangible future 
threats. Although the U.S. is making technological improvements in its ballistic 
missile defense capability, as most recently demonstrated by the successful Standard 
Missile 3 Block IIA (SM-3 Block IIA) flight test in February 2017,35 the solution to 
countering a tangible missile threat by North Korea will not likely come from the 
U.S. response to “disruptive technologies.”
These limitations present challenges for the U.S. military as it pursues increased 
interoperability with Japanese and Korean forces, a goal shared by the allies. Japan 
and South Korea have pursued military modernization by introducing U.S. military 
platforms and systems, as much as their defense budgets – far smaller than that of 
the United States – can afford. Japan’s engagement with the U.S. in joint research and 
development of missile defense capabilities, which will culminate in an upgrade of the 
SM-3 Block IIA interceptor, has helped propel armament cooperation with the U.S.36 
Although the results have been mixed to date, a South Korean government program 
requiring U.S. defense companies to provide and/or share technology and production 
with the South Korean defense industry aims to ensure that the joint development 
program will benefit the South Korean defense industrial base. Collaboration between 
Korean Aerospace Industries and Lockheed Martin on the T-50, light combat aircraft 
and one of the world’s few supersonic trainer jets, had a positive impact on defense 
technological cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea.37
Still, such cooperative efforts have focused on developing specialized systems to 
respond to specific requirements and security challenges. Extensive consultation 
on the strategic environment, and questions about how the strategic environment 
may evolve, has yet to take place.
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Talking around the issue with China
The conversation between the U.S. and China, of course, is of a different nature. 
As strategic competitors who are deeply entwined economically, and who share 
interests in regional stability but diverge when defining the nature and sources of 
that stability, the U.S. and China also need to consult on the impact of technological 
innovation – before either country disrupts the status quo by unveiling new 
capabilities, with the potential for unanticipated consequences. For the past decade, 
the U.S. and China have held Track 1.5 and Track 2 strategic dialogues to assess the 
state of the U.S.-China relationship at strategic and tactical levels, and to discuss 
the issue of a nuclear-armed North Korea.38 But there have been no Track 1 talks 
about strategic forces or emerging technologies.
While the United States and China have increased communication and 
engagement at the tactical level, strategic tensions between the two have 
heightened, particularly regarding nuclear issues and missile defense. The PLA 
continues to view the U.S. as the primary threat to China, and the U.S., while 
concerned in the short-term with North Korea, also sees China as a potential 
adversary for the foreseeable future.39 Indeed, within the context of the Third 
Offset Strategy, China is positioned as the U.S.’s likely primary adversary. 
Another point of high-level mismatch is China’s “no first-use” policy, which the 
U.S. has resisted reciprocating.40 On the U.S. side, concerns have been voiced 
in the strategic dialogues about “co-mingling,” or placement of conventional 
weapons alongside nuclear missile launchers, which could lead to unintentional 
escalation of conflict if nuclear capabilities are struck accidentally.41
This tactical/strategic divergence is apparent even within the Chinese nuclear 
community.42 The Chinese nuclear scientific establishment (e.g. the Beijing Institute 
of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics or the China Academy of 
Engineering Physics) has more experience in the international arena, and is willing 
to engage with the U.S. on strategic matters. Representatives from these institutions 
have attended Track 1.5 and Track 2 meetings, regularly participate in exchanges 
with American universities, and speak at conferences and on panels. But the PLA 
Rocket Force, a consolidated branch of the PLA granted responsibility for China’s 
nuclear weapons in 2015, has expressed limited willingness to engage on issues 
related to China’s nuclear strategy.43
Central to the matter of nuclear strategy is the broader concept of “strategic 
stability,” which also has implications for emerging technologies. The most recent 
strategic dialogues have attempted to clarify this concept, which the U.S. and 
China interpret differently.44 The U.S. values its alliances as a stabilizing influence 
in Northeast Asia. China’s view of the U.S. as a threat consequently extends to 
U.S. allies in Asia, and while Chinese delegates have acknowledged extended 
deterrence as a disincentive to nuclearization for Japan and South Korea, they 
remain concerned that states outside the U.S. nuclear umbrella will feel compelled 
to seek nuclear weapons.45 In addition, alliance strategies to counter North Korea’s 
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threat have the ability, to some extent, to threaten China’s own conventional and 
nuclear capabilities. Thus, China views the U.S. alliance system in Asia as possessing 
inherently destabilizing components – and sees efforts to deepen the alliances as 
exacerbating the destabilizing effect overall. At the heart of China’s concern is 
suspicion about American intentions as the U.S. and allies improve their capacity 
to mitigate North Korea’s threat.
Adding to the complexity of defining strategic stability and determining how 
to achieve it, both China and the U.S. are in the process of modernizing their 
nuclear arsenals. China is moving from a historic “lean and effective” disposition 
to greater retaliation capability, requiring a larger force.46 In a September 2015 
dialogue, Chinese delegates indicated that U.S. efforts to strengthen ballistic missile 
defense architecture were the impetus for China’s nuclear modernization, saying, 
“a firmer shield requires a sharper spear.”47 Meanwhile, the U.S. is modernizing its 
nuclear triad to provide “thinner but stronger legs.”48
Both initiatives are leading to some uncertainty about the feasibility of strategic 
stability. China fears that the U.S.’s theater missile defense will prompt North Korea 
to increase its capabilities, just as China has chosen to sharpen its own spear. The 
destabilizing effect of emerging technology in the nuclear realm has also been a 
topic of exploration within the strategic dialogues, in particular whether multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles that are not mated with nuclear warheads 
are destabilizing.49
Following on the heels of nuclear modernization are anticipated technologies 
that also could disrupt strategic stability. No firm agreement has been reached on 
responses to the entrance of new technologies. China fears that new-wave American 
technology, including hypersonic planes, space-based weapons, or more advanced 
ballistic missile defense capabilities, could offset its nuclear deterrence ability.50 
China’s concerns are exacerbated by deployment of American technology to U.S. 
partners in East Asia – notably THAAD in South Korea and Aegis in Japan, as 
well as the Precision Acquisition Vehicle Entry Phased Array Warning System 
in Taiwan.51 What the U.S. presents as single-use technology designed to counter 
North Korean threats is viewed as dual-use by China, simply by virtue of China’s 
proximity to North Korea.
As the U.S. and China develop and deploy new technologies, reaching a mutual 
understanding of strategic stability is becoming more complicated. The quagmire 
of issues that already surround nuclear capabilities is compounded when the 
discussion expands to emerging technologies that impact these capabilities and 
the broader strategic context. Establishing benchmarks for strategic stability and 
incorporating discussion of emerging technologies, while acknowledging that the 
discussion will evolve as technological capabilities change and strategic priorities 
shift, will remain a critical component of U.S.-China dialogue.
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Questions for defense experts in Northeast Asia
The Stimson team traveled to Japan, South Korea, and China to hold discussions 
with defense experts. Candid discussions, conducted under the Chatham House 
Rule, revealed the experts’ perceptions of American strategic debates on emerging 
technologies, disruption, and impact on military posture. The team offered the 
questions below to start the conversations, but followed avenues of interest to the 
participating analysts:
Questions for Japanese and South Korean experts
• To what extent are Washington-based efforts toward a Third Offset 
Strategy observed and discussed in Japan/South Korea?
• How does the Japanese/Korean strategic analysis community interpret 
“emerging/disruptive technology,” particularly in the context of a Third 
Offset Strategy?
• Is there a concern in Japan/South Korea that the U.S., in response to the 
security challenges posed by a competitor or adversary that leverages 
such technologies to their advantage, may take measures that make allies 
question U.S. commitment to deterrence? What measures might prompt 
such questioning?
• How would Japan/South Korea respond to weakening or strengthening of 
alliance cohesion in the context of the alliance having a strategic advantage 
or not?
• What are the possible benefits and drawbacks of a Third Offset Strategy for 
Northeast Asia?
• Which particular technologies should, or should not, be part of a Third 
Offset Strategy? 
• How might American actions to address the challenges presented by new 
technologies influence relations among Japan, South Korea, and China? 
Questions for Chinese experts
• What kind of technologies are disruptive with possible strategic implications 
for the balance that currently exists between the U.S. and China?
• Do strategic circles in China follow the U.S. discussion of the Third Offset 
Strategy? How do they interpret it?
• How might China leverage the emerging military technologies to sustain 
strategic stability with the U.S. (or gain comparative advantage vis-à-vis 
the U.S.), and vice versa?
• What does the future of U.S.-China strategic stability look like 
considering recent developments in military technology on both sides?
• How might American actions to address the challenges presented by disruptive 
technologies influence relations among Japan, South Korea, and China?
… 22 …
LOST IN TRANSLATION?
Views from Japan and South Korea
In Japan and South Korea, only a limited number of defense experts who closely 
follow U.S. defense strategy understand the American strategic debate on the impact 
of disruptive technologies and/or the Third Offset Strategy. The Stimson team’s 
exchanges with defense policy experts focused on drawing out their reactions to 
the description of disruptive technologies and the Third Offset Strategy provided 
by the Stimson team at the beginning of the discussion.
Japan views China as a threat requiring joint strategic responses with the U.S., and 
Japanese defense professionals calibrate their views about most defense technological 
developments in the next two decades with respect to China. Specifically, responses 
revolved around what Japan should do to develop a strong negotiating position with 
China, which has a more technologically advanced military. South Korean experts 
do not share this level of threat perception, and as such tend not to view the Third 
Offset Strategy as relevant to Korean security interests.
Both countries view North Korea as a clear and present security threat, and 
define their defense needs in relation to the quality of protection afforded by their 
alliance with the United States. However, as the Third Offset Strategy is generally 
understood to be focused on China, there is no substantial expectation in either 
country that the U.S. response to disruptive technology will address the threats 
posed by North Korea. Both countries would prefer instead to discuss specific 
capabilities that would address the threat posed by North Korea, such as leveraging 
existing missile defense cooperation with the U.S. In Japan, experts noted an interest 
in introducing indigenous “enemy base counter-attack” capability, a politically 
sensitive way to rephrase the more controversial term “offensive capability.”52
(1) Uncertainty about the Third Offset Strategy  
and the direction of U.S. strategy
The defense experts the Stimson team met in Japan and South Korea, including 
those who follow U.S. defense strategy very closely, appeared uncertain about where 
future U.S. strategy is heading. Many have been exposed to discussion within the 
U.S. on how to counter specific disruptive technologies (i.e., hypersonic weapons), 
but are not as familiar with disruptive technologies in the context of the Third 
Offset conversation. In both countries, analysts voiced questions about whether the 
Offset aims to maintain U.S. strategic superiority or U.S. dominance in military 
technology through improvements in streamlined operations, information 
management, or logistical efficiency.
Japanese experts seemed confused about the initiative’s strategic objective and 
in what ways it departs from previous defense transformation debates. There seem 
to be different views on the efficacy of the United States trying to coordinate with 
Japan to develop a new offset strategy. Some experts suggested that discussion 
of a long-term strategy in the abstract may not be productive because it could 
produce confusion about how the strategy would be operationalized at the tactical 
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level. Analysts described a lack of communication in Japan between the policy and 
operations sides that limits the flexibility necessary to promote innovative concepts 
like the Third Offset. They perceived interagency communication in the U.S. as 
relatively better, and suggested that Japan needed to improve this communication 
and interagency integration and jointness with allies in order to work more 
effectively with the U.S.
Analysts in South Korea were skeptical of the maturity of the concept, contrasting 
it with the New Look, in which an obvious defense problem was addressed with a 
specific technology. They argued that today’s Offset discussion has yet to articulate 
a defense problem and produce a clear solution. Some Korean analysts were 
especially concerned that the discussion, one element of which emphasizes game-
changing technologies like railgun, has raised hopes in Korea that the United States 
is about to unveil an unexpected new technological way to counter North Korea or 
China, or to dramatically increase firepower.
(2) Questions about the usefulness of the  
Third Offset for allies’ interests
Analysts raised concerns that the Third Offset’s focus on China and emerging 
technology does not address allies’ security interests in full. Japanese analysts 
perceived China as a threat, but are also urgently concerned about North Korea. 
Korean experts were primarily focused on countering threats from North Korea, 
and several were doubtful about the ultimate utility of the Third Offset as a defense 
and deterrence strategy in this respect. The analysts said that the Third Offset 
appeared to be about big power competition between the U.S. and China, and 
many did not see the strategic discourse in the U.S. as relevant to their own defense 
needs and dilemmas in a meaningful timeframe. Despite China’s assertive behavior 
in Asia, including its harsh response to the South Korean government’s decision 
to deploy THAAD, South Korean analysts were reluctant to discuss China as a 
security threat. When not viewing the issue through a pure North Korean lens, 
however, some Korean analysts did recognize the need for the United States to plan 
for the emerging technological environment, and suggested that it is important for 
the U.S. and its allies to prevent new technologies from being weaponized.
The extended timeline of the Offset was identified as a concern by some of the 
Japanese experts. Defense systems developed as part of the Offset would likely not 
be available until around 2040, leaving a window of vulnerability vis-à-vis China 
in the 2020s and 2030s, which is likely to be a worrying period in China’s military 
development. However, other Japanese security experts did not share this view. In 
fact, one analyst suggested that, given his expectation of linear security trends over 
the next decades, technological offsets would not be a critical issue. Instead, all Japan 
would need from the United States is a clearer Asia-Pacific strategy emphasizing the 
maintenance of U.S. forward-deployed forces and the continuation of investment 
in assets in the Asia-Pacific region. These perspectives, however, may be based on 
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potential misinterpretation (or overinterpretation) of the Third Offset, because they 
either seem to discount the usefulness of the Offset against its main target or the 
necessity of the Offset altogether.
Several Korean analysts questioned the timing, as well as the target, wondering if 
the Offset had any relevance for South Korea. These experts viewed the decades-long 
timeline for development of the Offset technologies as useless against the immediate 
threat of North Korea, regardless of the technologies’ long-term utility in the North 
Korean context. Some asked whether the U.S. understood what deterrence meant 
for South Korea, given the vast distance between North Korea and the United States. 
The conversation suggested that, while Washington and Seoul share concerns about 
security threats posed by North Korea, the emphasis each country places on the 
types of threats from North Korea may not be either well aligned or well understood 
outside small circles of defense planners in both countries.
Several Japanese analysts also noted the Offset’s strong emphasis on leveraging 
advanced technology in alliance interoperability. They suggested that the focus on 
technology may be excessive, given that strategic competitors such as China will 
eventually be able to catch up with the U.S. technologically, either by offsetting 
technologies or by leveraging them sooner than the U.S. One argument posits that 
the real competition between the U.S. and China will center not only on shortening 
the time from R&D to acquisition, but also on the speed and cost-effectiveness of 
adaptation in doctrines, policies, and laws to technological changes.
Korean analysts cautioned that the U.S. should not place too much emphasis on 
technological development in its strategizing, because superior technology has not 
always granted victory. As examples, the analysts cited the Vietnam War, which 
the U.S. lost despite possessing a technological advantage, and Russia’s current 
advances, for which the analysts noted doubts about the U.S. response. The Korean 
analysts also reiterated that the Third Offset had no technological relevance for 
the North Korea issue, as several possible Offset technologies were merely delivery 
systems, like railgun, and not revolutionary technologies that would create new 
strategic concerns for North Korea.
(3) Concerns about the effects on alliance cohesion
Most Japanese analysts did not seem to think that leveraging disruptive technologies 
to respond to potential adversaries would fundamentally affect the credibility of the 
U.S.-Japan alliance. They believed the U.S.-Japan alliance had the capacity to adapt 
to major geostrategic changes, just as the alliance adapted to the post-Cold War 
world order, but that managing emerging technologies in an alliance context was 
the main challenge. Several analysts cautioned that it is difficult to update standard 
operating procedures, but noted that the alliance has dealt with crises before; if 
both partners commit to working on integrating an emerging technology, then 
alliance enhancement is possible. Japanese analysts suggested joint assessments 
of the future of warfare and how the U.S. and Japan can work together in specific 
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situations with new technology, and Korean experts agreed that it is imperative 
for the United States to involve its allies in discussions around U.S. responses to 
disruptive technologies, so that the allies can harmonize their responses.
Underscoring the need for partnership, Japanese analysts appeared wary of 
the potential for negative consequences if the U.S. creates a new strategy and then 
informs its allies. They held the view that allies must participate in the process 
of creating strategic concepts. As such, the experts expressed their preference 
for discussions about strategy, ideally from a whole-of-alliance perspective that 
includes political questions and helps enable U.S.-Japan joint operations. They 
were deeply critical, however, of Japan’s lack of internal coordination on defense 
technological development. Whether due to an absence of jointness in the military 
or a lack of communication between policymakers and technical specialists, they 
indicated that Japan would not be ready to work with the U.S. on an offset strategy 
until Japan became more coherent internally.
Japanese analysts identified target tracking and prompt strike capability as 
technological improvements that would improve the alliance’s capabilities vis-à-vis 
North Korean and Chinese missiles, and recommended that the U.S. permit Japan 
to build strategic offensive capabilities in response to the threat from China. One 
analyst described missile defense as the glue of the alliance, a specific area in which 
the U.S. and Japan share common interests and strategy. In other areas like space 
and cybersecurity, the analysts recognized that the capabilities gap between the U.S. 
and Japan has been growing and Japan needs to catch up. Analysts noted worries 
that Japan will be unable to join U.S. conversations about cyber deterrence without 
developing offensive cyber capabilities; likewise, the U.S. is currently working to 
improve the resilience of space capabilities while the Japanese Ministry of Defense 
(MOD) has only begun to consider the topic. There could be a negative impact on the 
alliance if the gap in certain domains or with specific technologies grows too big to 
bridge, or if U.S. systems become too advanced to cooperate productively with allies 
in these areas, especially considering the political dimension of procurement issues.
Japanese and Korean analysts agreed on a potential game-changer: a move away 
from forward deployment because of emerging technologies that facilitate long-
range options. Experts in both countries expressed deep concerns about the effect 
on the credibility of the alliance if the U.S. were to move toward the kinds of postures 
envisioned by some advocates of a Third Offset. Japanese analysts emphasized 
that should U.S. military technology no longer require the sizable presence of 
troops on bases in Japan, consultation in advance of any changes to deployment 
would be critical to sustaining the alliance. Losing the physical commitment of 
American soldiers in Japan would fundamentally change the alliance dynamic. 
For example, unmanned and autonomous weapons platforms, even if they are 
forward-deployed in the region, would be ill-suited as concrete signs of U.S. defense 
commitments. They would likely lack the “tripwire” implication inherent in the 
practice of placing American personnel in harm’s way, making more credible the 
commitment to treating an attack on an ally as equivalent to an attack on the U.S. 
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Even the possibility of human-machine teaming, potentially reducing the role of 
people in the decision-making loop, would raise questions about U.S. military 
operations in the region. Would the U.S. be willing to act unilaterally, or without 
sufficient consultations, if new technology changes the decision-making process? 
Korean analysts linked alliance commitment with the visible deterrence 
provided by American bases and troops in South Korea. Some bluntly stated 
that Koreans cared more about the physical presence than the alliance’s future 
technological portfolio as a deterrent against North Korea’s threats. The analysts’ 
strong interest in tangible deterrence was reflected in their preference for weapons 
platforms that could be used for preemptive strikes against the North’s nuclear 
missiles. A recent movement toward greater self-reliance, at the extreme including 
calls for an indigenous nuclear weapons program, appears to have lost momentum 
among defense analysts, possibly after the deployment of THAAD. Analysts 
noted in discussion that missile defense can be used quickly, reducing reliance 
on U.S. backup – thus mellowing concerns about the U.S. alliance commitment 
without substantially assuaging them. To Korean experts, deploying Third Offset 
technology with an increased strike range, coupled with a reduced force presence, 
sounded like a strategic withdrawal from the Korean Peninsula.
(4) Concerns about the effects on  
domestic defense industrial bases
Anxiety about an overemphasis in U.S. strategy on leveraging advanced technology 
also seems to be driven by concerns about the implications of such strategy for 
indigenous defense industries. Japanese and Korean experts are pessimistic 
about their own countries’ ability to develop and field offsetting technologies. 
One example that was identified in Japan was cybersecurity: great reluctance in 
academia and the private sector to be perceived as actively engaged in projects that 
benefit Japan’s defense industrial base makes it unlikely that Japan would be able 
to recruit technologies from its high-tech sector the way the Third Offset concept 
envisions leveraging the technological capacity residing in Silicon Valley. In Korea, 
experts worried that an American focus on Silicon Valley would undermine the 
viability of Korea’s defense industry. Koreans also expect that, despite the South 
Korean government’s efforts to ensure its defense industry will benefit from 
collaboration with the U.S. industry by establishing the offset program, the United 
States will restrict the sharing of new technologies the same way it has rebuffed 
previous requests from South Korea to transfer core technology. As such, though 
the Third Offset emphasizes the importance of utilizing the industrial capacity of 
allies, Korean experts appear very doubtful that the U.S. will engage in the deeper 
technology cooperation that would lead to mutually beneficial technology sharing.
Concern in Japan is also driven by analysts’ pessimistic outlook regarding 
Japan’s future defense budgets. Most analysts projected that the ratio of defense 
expenditures to gross domestic product would remain low, for domestic political and 
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associated regulatory reasons that restrict the kinds of technological development 
the government can sponsor. Not only has the Ministry of Defense failed to convince 
universities to accept funding for defensive technology R&D, but the MOD’s own 
R&D division is small and has not sought out new technology in the same way 
as the DOD’s Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Analysts 
mentioned that Japanese universities accept R&D funding from the Pentagon, so 
the reluctance to accept MOD funding appears to be tied to the unpopularity of 
the SDF. In addition, referring to a case in which a small Japanese robotics firm 
was acquired by Google after its robot won a competition managed by DARPA in 
2013, Japanese experts expressed concerns about American buyouts of firms that 
offer cutting-edge technologies.
Furthermore, experts conveyed unease about the possibility that a technology-
driven U.S. strategy may eventually lead to Japan’s complete reliance on the U.S. 
for advanced defense systems. Given that Japan’s defense acquisition mostly comes 
through foreign military sales (FMS), almost all of which are from the United States,53 
the analysts seemed worried that further dependence on FMS could set in motion 
the destruction of Japan’s indigenous defense industrial base. One expert pointed 
out that the U.S.-Japan alliance is larger than equipment purchase contracts, so 
the two countries should partner strategically on development initiatives that can 
benefit both countries’ defense industrial bases. Despite Japan’s limited funds for 
R&D, licensing or bilateral projects could help to lower the threshold for Japanese 
participation in technological development and strengthen Japan’s industrial base.
Such comments seem to be driven by analysts’ concern about future competition 
between the Japanese and American defense industries, if Japan’s defense industry 
becomes successful without close cooperation and coordination between the two 
on defense technology strategy. Those who expressed concern about this prospect 
pointed to tensions between Japan and the United States over Japan’s Fighter 
Support Experimental program in the 1980s, when Japan sought technological 
cooperation from the U.S. as it developed what eventually became the F-2 fighter 
aircraft. Japan’s efforts to build the F-2 based on the American technology used 
to build the F-16 generated significant backlash from the U.S. Congress. Korean 





The Chinese defense policy community is watching the Third Offset Strategy 
conversation warily, as they view the United States as the primary threat to 
stability in Northeast Asia. In discussions with the Stimson team, Chinese defense 
analysts described the addition of emerging technologies as not only a potential 
destabilizer of the warfighting capabilities balance between the two countries, but 
as an element impacting strategy and stability more broadly. Speculation on the 
impact of emerging technologies, and on the future of the U.S.-China relationship, 
varied significantly among Chinese analysts, however.54
(1) Viewing the Third Offset conversation  
in a strategic context
Chinese experts reported that the Third Offset Strategy is followed closely in 
China, particularly by scholars of international relations and military strategists. 
The consensus is that the Offset is designed to counter China’s growing capabilities, 
with other potential adversaries like Russia or the Islamic State holding a lower 
priority. Analysts suggested that the DOD might use the ostensible threat from 
China to attract funding. A minority held that the Offset is intended to provoke 
China into a ruinous arms race analogous to the effect of Strategic Defense 
Initiative plans on the Soviet Union. Newer domains like cyber and space came 
up in each meeting as the areas that the analysts thought would be the domains 
of the Offset in the future, but several analysts also noted that the timing of the 
Offset technology rollout was years away, possibly as far as the 2030s.
Chinese analysts placed the discussion in the larger strategic context of regional 
stability and U.S.-China relations. They emphasized their preference to think about 
strategic stability broadly, covering multiple facets of the U.S.-China relationship, 
from economic to political to security. This view tempered their concern over 
China as a target of Third Offset technology, but they asserted that the potential 
of Offset technology to destabilize the region is worrisome. However, one analyst 
noted that the Third Offset Strategy, unlike the previous two offset strategies, offers 
more opportunities for dialogue on issues like the next war and future arms races. 
Deep economic and trade ties between the U.S. and China, which did not exist 
between the U.S. and the USSR, are strong incentives to carry out this dialogue, 
and analysts agree that China might be open to such conversations.
The analysts acknowledged that the conversation between the U.S. and China 
on strategic stability is limited at present, to the point that “strategic stability” 
mostly means “arms control.” Several analysts stressed that China does not want 
an arms race with the U.S., and occasionally granted that the United States was a 
Pacific nation with legitimate regional interests. Any frictions were due to other 
countries feeling emboldened to make expansive territorial claims in the hope 
of securing U.S. backing; if these sovereignty disputes were to be resolved, then 
tension between China and the U.S. would decrease.
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(2) Perspectives on the potential impact  
of the Offset on U.S. alliances
Chinese analysts offered varying perspectives on U.S. alliance partners in 
Northeast Asia. Most portrayed Japan’s increase in military capability and efforts 
towards constitutional reform as a dangerous development. The prospect of Japan 
losing confidence in the United States and activating its latent nuclear weapons 
capability was a concern for some. A minority of experts conceded that Japan is 
far from the aggressive military power it once was, also dismissing any claims of 
Japanese regional leadership. Analysts viewed South Korea’s decision to deploy 
THAAD as a major concern, as South Korea might eventually have a joint missile 
defense system with both the U.S. and Japan. Analysts opined that Japan and 
South Korea’s concerns about possible U.S. retrenchment emerged because allies 
prioritized matters of deployment rather than the technology under development, 
while adversaries would watch the technology pipeline that may result in future 
acquisition programs more closely. The analysts suggested that because the length 
of the pipeline is at least a couple decades, there are multiple points at which 
development can alter course, so it was in the allies’ interest to focus more on 
technology that had already passed these developmental hurdles.
According to Chinese experts, missile defense systems in Northeast Asia have 
become a thorn in China’s side, particularly THAAD, as they have the capability to 
damage China’s own systems. The development of missile defense systems among 
U.S. allies has prompted, in part, China’s own efforts to modernize its military and 
prepare to counter more robust capabilities in the region. The analysts cautioned 
several times that it is difficult to tell offensive from defensive systems, and 
conventional from nonconventional missiles. The strategic context of these systems 
and weapons is critical: without understanding potential adversaries’ strategic 
intentions, sophisticated systems and emerging technology become dangerous. 
The key, several analysts argued, is confidence building both between the U.S. and 
China and the U.S. and its allies.
Analysts described North Korea’s nuclear weapons program as a security 
problem for China, due in part to the threat to China from American alliance 
countermeasures like THAAD. Analysts agreed that China’s leverage over North 
Korea had declined, leaving China with few options. Some noted that China has 
treaty obligations to defend North Korea should the U.S. or another country attack, 
but could only suggest sanctions or dialogue as methods of addressing North 
Korean provocations. However, experts emphasized that part of the problem is 
North Korea’s ability to exploit U.S.-China tension and competition, and the Third 
Offset might exacerbate that competition.
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(3) Uncertainty about the future of the  
Third Offset Strategy under the Trump administration
Analysts expressed uncertainty about the direction of the Third Offset under the 
Trump administration. Some thought it would continue while Robert Work remained 
in the DOD to promote relevant technology. Everyone agreed that the U.S. defense 
budget would need to increase, though some viewed the increase as necessary for a 
broader transformation of U.S. military resources with new technology. The strategic 
context will also matter for the future of the Offset: if the DOD determines that other 
adversaries like the Islamic State are more immediate concerns, then the technology 
in the Offset portfolio will have to adjust. Concerns about the Trump administration 
possibly expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal also arose.
So far, the absence of an articulated military strategy associated with the Third 
Offset has prevented PLA officers and planners from understanding the details, instead 
leading them to view it as a general threat. Several analysts were concerned about the 
variance in understanding of the Offset within China, asserting that strategists in the 
PLA lack a nuanced understanding of technological issues and thus oversimplify the 
Offset as simply a strategy to contain China. The operational planners, however, were 
more realistic in assessing the array of U.S. capabilities in various combinations as well 
as the dynamics within the DOD and the military branches.
Interest in the details of the Offset conversation and relevant future scenarios 
is very high across the country’s defense community. Seminars and conferences 
on associated topics have been well-attended, and this is likely to continue as 
Chinese experts wait for the Trump administration to determine its course on 
the Offset.
(4) Views on the U.S.-China capability gap
Other analysts said that the Offset was not worrying due to its uncertain fate, and 
that China put greater emphasis on closing the capability gap between China and 
the U.S. Analysts were divided on the nature of this gap. Some asserted that the 
strategic balance with the U.S. had shifted strongly in China’s favor, and the U.S. 
would not, for example, send aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait today during 
heightened tensions. Some reported that the PLA was confident in its ability to 
prevail in a conflict with the United States within the first island chain. Others 
emphasized areas in which China lagged, such as the generation gap between 
American and Chinese aircraft carriers and fighter jets. Even so, the analysts 
demonstrated a nuanced view of the capability gap. A gap in a specific technology 
might result in certain situational disadvantages, but would not necessarily mean 
an absolute gap. Analysts noted that China’s discussions of capabilities were not so 
narrow as to focus on one domain or technology at a time, but assessed a spectrum 
of capabilities to gain a comprehensive perspective on warfare. In this respect, 
communication about the gap is also important: multiple arms races in each aspect 
of the gap are not beneficial for maintaining regional stability.
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Several analysts also made a distinction between human and technological 
factors, which could influence calculations of the cost of war. If the U.S., for 
example, deployed technology that could limit American human involvement in a 
conflict with Chinese troops who still relied on manpower, the costs of the conflict 
would be very different for both sides: expensive in technology for the U.S., but 
costly in terms of lives for China. Within the context of U.S. alliances as well, the 
analysts noted that alliance commitment required deploying people as well as 
technology. The analysts implied that such scenarios needed analysis by both the 
U.S. and China.
The Chinese military is currently undergoing major reforms intended for 
completion over the next decade, a modernization process that analysts described 
as an effort to streamline the PLA and increase its quality (though some felt the 
mammoth process was disorderly). While the process emphasizes the development 
of maritime domain capabilities, particularly where China will encounter the U.S., 
analysts noted that China’s land-based security concerns were still important, 
requiring a military of diverse capabilities. When asked about the impact of 
the modernization on arms control, analysts asserted that great powers needed 
proportionate military power.
While a review of doctrine is part of this transition and seeks to exploit new 
technologies, analysts described their government’s approach as reactive to U.S. 
technology development. However, a new contracting approach has opened the 
door for competition between state and private companies, even if hardware will 
continue to be the exclusive purview of state-owned enterprises. Some analysts 
suggested that the PLA, by studying the Third Offset and ideas from other countries, 
would eventually form a DARPA-like organization and that the PLA is currently 
considering new technologies such as unmanned vehicles and drones. Analysts 
noted that despite competing sources of funding for technology development 
between the PLA and the government, investment in these technologies has been 
increasing, following China’s concern about the potential for conflict (with the 
U.S. and others) with cyber- and space-based capabilities, especially cross-domain 
threats and possibly American nuclear use in space.
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Recommendations
The preceding two sections examined the history of U.S. strategic debate about 
RMA and offset strategies, and how such debates – particularly the contemporary 
discourse on the Third Offset – are viewed by China and U.S. allies in Northeast Asia.
As the U.S. continues to manage its alliance relationships in the context of the 
Third Offset, policymakers can be informed by several key lessons learned from 
the First and Second Offset Strategies: 
Overwhelming technological superiority of the U.S.  
makes intra-alliance management challenging.
The technological gap between the U.S. military and its allied counterparts 
that resulted from the first two offset strategies has made the effort to ensure 
interoperability between them extremely difficult. As demonstrated by the 
experience of NATO operations in Kosovo in the mid-1990s, the technological 
gap between the U.S. military and allied NATO forces created problems both in 
communications among them and in conducting operations. Similarly, the fear 
that advanced American technology will irreversibly outstrip allies’ capabilities 
persists among allies.
 
Allies will only invest in disruptive technologies that  
serve their perceived needs.
The main thrust of alliance problems associated with RMA seems to be that allies 
have been and continue to diverge in their perception of prioritization among the 
security threats that they share with the U.S. Given the limitation in their defense 
spending, such divergence likely results in differing priorities in defense spending 
by allies, especially in their investment in technologies. The key example of this 
may be the U.S.’s declared focus on investing in technologies such as artificial 
intelligence, while Japan shows an increasing interest in acquiring additional 
missile defense capabilities such as THAAD and Aegis Ashore to meet its more 
immediate defense needs.
Communicating new strategies driven by complex  
advanced technology is challenging.
The overarching critique by U.S. allies of the Second Offset Strategy was its lack 
of clarity. The U.S. did not engage its allies sufficiently as it developed the Second 
Offset, nor did it articulate in time the goals and specific technology on which 
the strategy would focus once it was developed. Especially because collaboration 
with allies is often emphasized in the Third Offset Strategy, it is in the U.S.’s 
interest to be as articulate as it can be regarding its goals, including technologies 
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LOST IN TRANSLATION?
in which the U.S. is most interested in investing, so that the allies have a better 
understanding of the Offset itself, and can make more informed decisions about 
their own defense investments.
Based on the conversations in Northeast Asia discussed in the previous section, 
it is clear that the lessons learned outlined above remain relevant. This is especially 
the case now that, with the new Trump administration in place, a new defense team 
led by Secretary of Defense James Mattis may take a different approach to thinking 
about the Third Offset Strategy. As the U.S. explores ways to respond to the impact 
of disruptive technologies on its military strategy in Northeast Asia while seeking 
to minimize miscommunication with Japan, South Korea, and China, the following 
steps may serve as good starting points for consideration.
1. Make greater efforts to articulate the debate within the U.S. on defense 
strategies both in official and non-official (Track 2) discussion venues.
Conversations in all three countries demonstrated that there is confusion over 
U.S. strategies, including the Third Offset. Most concerning is that, despite 
the limited understanding of U.S. strategic intent, a potential adversary seems 
to have a better understanding of U.S. strategic discourse than allies in the 
region. This needs to be rectified not only to reassure allies but also to prevent 
strategic miscalculation. To this end, the U.S. should utilize various consultative 
mechanisms, including strategic dialogues, with countries in Northeast Asia to 
communicate the intention and goal of American strategies. Track 2 dialogues 
in which government officials can more freely discuss these issues with their 
counterparts in Japan and South Korea will also be helpful in this regard. At the 
time of such conversations, U.S. technological and strategic assumptions, rather 
than remaining tacit, should be made explicit to the extent possible. These small 
steps can have a major positive effect in clarifying U.S. intentions and reassuring 
allied governments.
The U.S. and China have participated in Track 2 security dialogues for years, 
and these conversations have made some progress in identifying and clarifying 
issues in the strategic relationship. These dialogues are an ideal venue for 
further exploration of the potential impact of disruptive technology on strategic 
stability, as well as cross-domain retaliation and the U.S. alliances. As pursuit 
of emerging technology by either side is likely to provide new challenges for 
U.S.-China relations, discussion of mutual strategic intent in this context could 
mitigate tensions resulting from changing technological capacities. At the least, 
the dialogues ensure that communications are ongoing. If military-to-military 
relations continue to improve, communication between the governments may 
also expand to these critical topics.
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2. Hold more honest, and public when possible, conversations between the U.S. 
and its allies regarding the difference between peacetime force deployments and 
the effective posture in wartime.
As the U.S. attempts to counter the challenges posed by disruptive technology, one 
of its major tasks is navigating the operational reality that the preferred peacetime 
posture, which reassures U.S. allies overseas, may not be the most desirable force 
posture in times of elevated tension. Furthermore, U.S. planners need to not only 
acknowledge that there will be a certain level of vulnerability that must be accepted 
(i.e., hardening of the facilities and assets in overseas bases), but also think more 
seriously about force dispersal if they do not want to accept that vulnerability. 
However, to reassure allies, any force dispersal plan in case of contingency must be 
discussed carefully, as it will deeply affect the allies’ confidence in the U.S. defense 
commitment. Although such honest conversation may be already taking place 
at the military-to-military level between the U.S. and its allies based on specific 
contingency scenarios, translating the discussion into a narrative that is palatable 
for those outside of the defense establishment – and for the broader public – remains 
a challenge. As the debate over the Third Offset Strategy continues to evolve within 
the U.S., ways to communicate with allies need to be carefully considered.
3. Engage Japan and South Korea in more robust bilateral  
as well as trilateral force planning.
The U.S. currently has different levels of consultation and operational planning 
with Japan and South Korea. On the one hand, the SDF and U.S. forces in Japan 
do not have a combined force structure, primarily due to the legal limitations 
imposed by the SDF on its operations outside Japan, based on Article 9 of 
Japan’s Constitution. Because of this limitation, the SDF and the U.S. military 
do not engage in detailed bilateral military contingency planning. Based on the 
April 2015 revision of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, the 
two countries have now instituted an alliance coordination mechanism (ACM), 
composed of three layers (policy, operational, and tactical). While this has been 
utilized for consultation between the two countries on several occasions in 
2016, including North Korea’s nuclear test in January 2016, how well the ACM 
functions overall is yet to be seen, particularly at operational and tactical levels, 
in case of contingencies that directly affect Japan or U.S. military operations 
in East Asia.55
On the other hand, the U.S. and South Korea already have a combined force 
command (CFC) and as such bilateral contingency planning is an integral part of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance. However, the planning at the CFC level focuses primarily 
on North Korea, and while the policymakers of the two countries do discuss 
broader regional security issues in the existing alliance consultation framework, 




What makes this situation more complex for the U.S. is the lack of opportunities 
for detailed conversation on military planning and coordination in a U.S.-Japan-
Korea trilateral framework, let alone between South Korea and Japan due to a 
deep sense of mistrust between Tokyo and Seoul. While the signing of the General 
Security of Military Information Agreement between Japan and South Korea in 
2016 makes it easier for the trilateral discussion to take place if the subject is limited 
to North Korea, it is still extremely difficult to hold U.S.-Japan-Korea trilateral 
consultation on region-wide force posturing.
To this end, trilateral contingency planning for various scenarios on North Korea 
in which disruptive technologies may play a role would be helpful to (1) familiarize 
both Japan and South Korea to the real-life impact of disruptive technologies on 
operations, and (2) provide opportunities for the U.S. to communicate its concerns 
in regards to the operational challenges posed by the gap between its peacetime 
forward-deployment posture for reassurance and deterrence and the desirable 
force posture for effective operation in contingencies by working through specific 
hypothetical scenarios.
4. Continue defense enterprise-wide procurement reform to create a 
procurement environment in which the U.S. defense industry and its allied 
country counterparts can establish mutually beneficial business models.
Defense experts in both Japan and South Korea expressed their concerns about 
the impact of the U.S. spearheading efforts to respond to the impact of disruptive 
technologies in the context of the Third Offset Strategy, and on further widening 
the technological gap that already exists between the U.S. defense industrial base 
and their own defense industries. The primary objective of the Third Offset is to 
improve the combat effectiveness of U.S. forces in challenging – and potentially 
contested – operational environments. However, the role of allies and their 
industrial bases in complementing U.S. efforts, as Robert Work alluded to in 
his 2015 remarks, is also critical for the success of the Third Offset.56 Currently, 
the U.S. has a bilateral defense industrial dialogue and cooperation mechanism 
with Japan and South Korea, led by the DOD. For the purpose of facilitating 
a dialogue on leveraging innovation in the defense sector, it may be useful to 
pursue consultations on defense innovation among the U.S., Japan, and South 
Korea. Restrictions on releasing information about sensitive technology will 
continue to present a challenge for such a dialogue, however. To this end, the 
U.S. needs to continue to work with Japan and South Korea to ensure that they 
will have a reliable framework to credibly address U.S. concerns for the security 
of sensitive technological information.
As the U.S. continues to calibrate its responses, efforts to leverage the 
technological capacity of not only the U.S. private sector but also the industrial 
bases – both defense and non-defense – of the allied countries through export 
control reform, acquisition reform, and the DII must continue. In this context, the 
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current process of reorganizing the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, mandated by the 2017 National Defense 
Authorization Act, can present a critical opportunity.57 These defense enterprise-
wide efforts need to be opened to enable participation by the industries of allied 
countries, including attempts to establish a process for moving from joint R&D 
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U.S. Defense Innovation and Northeast Asia
The United States must ensure that its military can adapt 
to an evolving threat environment to maintain its relative 
advantage vis-à-vis potential adversaries. Should the 
U.S. tackle this task unilaterally, however, the perception 
of relative U.S. decline will only aggravate uncertainties in 
Japan and South Korea about U.S. defense commitments 
– and in China about U.S. intentions in Asia. The views of 
U.S. allies and partners are shaped in part by the debate 
in the United States about future defense technology 
and concepts, a debate that is perceived to be more 
thinking-aloud than substantial policy. This report 
examines Northeast Asian perceptions of the risks 
posed by disruptive technologies in the military sphere 
and recommends a series of policy steps to minimize 
these risks.
